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New interpretations of Marxism began appearing in Polish philosophy 
after 1955, and some of them enriched Marxism with inspirations 
stemming from contemporary Western philosophy. Among the most 
important of the new interpretations from the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s were the interpretations developed in The Poznan 
Methodological School founded by Jerzy Kmita, Jerzy Topolski, and 
Leszek Nowak. In this paper, as stated in the title, I will deal only with 
Kmita’s interpretation of Marxism, although all three of the 
interpretations, which appeared simultaneously, deserve individual 
discussion. One can even talk about three distinct interpretations of 
Marxism that were motivated by common assumptions. Among these 
assumptions I would mention the belief held by the founders of The 
Poznan Methodological School during the whole period of its activity. 
They believed that Marx’s method of inquiry was exceptionally inspiring 
and useful for the study of social phenomena. The input of The Poznan 
Methodological School into the evolution of Marxism in Poland is 
extremely original and valuable. Besides its historical value, it is also 
still inspiring and brings methodological tools that enable reflection on 
the whole of the socio-economic system and the place of the human 
activity within it. 
 Taking on the issue of Kmita’s interpretation, I need to begin by 
indicating some problems, which in my opinion had influenced Kmita’s 
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interpretation of Marxist philosophy. The first one pertains to the 
approach of the leader of The Poznan Methodological School to Marx's 
legacy. His approach was specific and very non-standard within Polish 
philosophy, especially in the context of Marxist philosophy in Poland in 
those days. Kmita’s interpretation was done from the perspective of the 
philosophy of science, and not through the horizon of the dominant – 
ideological – approach to this philosophy. Metaphorically speaking, 
Kmita was interested in “Marx’s road to freedom”. From this point of 
view, Kmita’s interpretational perspective was extremely innovative. At 
that time the philosophy of science went through a turbulent 
development. The ideas   of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, or Willard Van 
Orman Quine appeared, and in Poland the works of the Lvov-Warsaw 
School were carried on, mainly by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. These 
conceptions were widely discussed not only in philosophy–including 
Polish philosophy, but were also popular among the scientists 
themselves. In Poland the representatives of the Poznan School were 
pioneers that popularized and creatively followed the developments of 
the Western philosophy of science (Jerzy Giedymin, Jerzy Kmita). 
As I mentioned before, the philosophy of science was one of the 
important points of reference in Kmita’s interpretation of Marx, and it 
made its mark defining the range of the interpretation. What Kmita was 
interested in was not as much the substance of this conception (i.e. the 
propositions from the field of economics or those relating to social 
structure), but rather the way of thinking of the author of Capital. He did 
not confront Marx’s theses with existing economic or humanistic 
knowledge, he did not develop any theme usually connected with 
Marxism. Kmita was interested in Marx’s form of thinking, the way he 
organised the relevant substantive statements, which means that Kmita 
was interested in Marx’s methodology of inquiry. The presence of 
Marx’s substantive statements was limited to two cases: either they 
illustrated the epistemological theses formulated independently of 
Marx’s doctrine, or the content of Capital was the basis for the 
reconstruction of research procedures applied by Marx. This approach 
to Marx’s legacy was far from typical, and it received a negative 
response in the community of Polish Marxists. It must not be forgotten 
that it all happened in the country in which Marxist ideology was 
dominating, and intellectuals were supposed to support this ideology. 
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The most repeated accusation against the Poznan Methodological 
School and its approach to Marx’s legacy was made from the ideological 
point of view. This accusation was expressed in the statement which 
implied that this interpretation of Marxism is „too logical” or that it was 
made “in the spirit of neopositivism”. This is not the first time in history 
when an ideology became the enemy of rational thinking. 
The interpretation that will be discussed below, was made in 
light of the interpretative coefficient of the interpreter. Kmita’s 
interpretative factor consisted of the analytic philosophy of science, 
with a particular regard for the humanities, and his theoretical 
reflection on art (symbolic culture). 
The second issue that should also be discussed at the beginning 
pertains to the status of the interpretation. I found it groundless to 
think about Kmita’s interpretation in terms of revisionism, as far as 
revisionism  understood as the interpretation of Marx’s thoughts 
initiated by Bernstein, or in terms of its definition given by Gomułka1, or 
as the approach to Marxism represented by a group of left-wing Polish 
intellectuals2. Even though the methodological interpretation of Marx 
did not represent “the spirit of Marxism” for some Polish Marxists, on 
the account of its specificity, Kmita always emphasized that he 
interpreted Marx’s method „by bringing into his arguments some, 
frequently considerable, modernizing corrections, but still sticking to 
this ‘something’”. (Kmita, 2007, p. 279). Also, this interpretation is not 
the comprehensive perspective on Marx’s research method, it limits 
itself to some selected methodological issues that were still essential for 
Marxism, as well as for the practice of science and philosophy in the 20th 
century, especially for the research in social sciences. 
                                                          
1At the IX Plenum of the Central Committee of PZPR in 1957 W. Gomulka criticized 
revisionism: „Revisionism is the set of false and erroneous views essentially coming 
down to the negation of the regularities of social development that are objective and 
validated by the every-day reality, to the negation or undermining of the basic 
experiences of the revolutionary labour movement, that have its universal use at the 
given stage of the historical progress”. 
2„Revisionists” was the name given to the group of the left-wing intelligentsia that was 
active from the second half of the 1950’s to the end of the 1960’s. It consisted of 
Kołakowski, Brus, Baczko, Pomian, Modzelewski, Kuron , Bien kowski, as well as 
“Puławy” group: Albrecht, Zambrowski, Kosman. 
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As I already mentioned, Kmita’s interest in Marxism falls on the 
turn of 1960’s and 1970’s. During this period, he published a series of 
papers on Marx’s method and edited some books3. After many years, in 
the 21st century, he made an assessment of Marxism in the Polish 
intellectual life and his part in it, answering the question asked by Jacek 
Hoło wka, the editor-in-chief of Przegląd Filozoficzny, about the role of 
Marxist philosophy in Polish intellectual life. The answer was published 
in [Kmita 2007]. This is important in the context of this paper because 
in that work Kmita formulates his position on Marx’s philosophy and 
Marxism in Poland. In it, he held up his previous beliefs about Marx’s 
conception that had been formulated in the 1960’s and 1970’s when the 
interpretation of Marx presented here had been developed. 
Up until circa 1955, as Kmita says, it was forbidden to discuss 
Marxism in Poland: “A serious discussion about philosophy, including 
Marxist philosophy, could not happen here. (…) there was no one (…) to 
discuss Marxist philosophy seriously due to current political reasons. 
The cultural and historical causes of all this were also playing their 
part” (Kmita, 2007, p. 278). 
Until 1955 it was impossible “to develop the disparate 
interpretations of Marxist philosophy” that were making use of the 
philosophical inspirations coming from the West. Kmita’s interpretation 
of Marxism was developed in this atmosphere of permission to draw on 
the inspirations from Western philosophy. In the presented paper Kmita 
emphasizes that his interest in Marxism does not come only from the 
permission to develop new interpretations of Marxism. He believes that 
Marxism, and especially Karl Marx's concepts „in spite of being 
anachronised, mainly after the death of the great philosopher–its 
creator–(…) considerably inspired the very core of the contemporary 
philosophy. Following Margolis, we can call this core cultural relativism; 
Karl Marx himself would surely prefer the term ‘historical relativism’” 
(Kmita, 2007, p. 280). Emphasising the influence of Marx on 
contemporary Western philosophy, Kmita named Marx’s pioneering 
idea: the introduction of thinking in the vein of cultural (historical) 
relativism into philosophical considerations. This particular 
                                                          
3 (Kmita 1973; 1974; 1977). 
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accomplishment of Marx's proved to be priceless. Let us notice that it 
was not until the end of the 20th century that the idea of relativism had 
become the centre of philosophers’ attention, for instance in Kuhn's 
theory or in American neopragmatism and postmodernism. Kmita’s 
main objection to Marx was about the latter’s too far-reaching 
acceptance of the methods of natural sciences in the humanities, and 
Marx’s fixation on the naturalised vision of science that he had carried 
over to the field of social research. 
In 1970, Kmita’s paper titled Uwagi o holizmie marksowskim jako 
koncepcji metodologicznej was published (Kmita, 1970, p. 61-122), 
wherein he presented the fundamental outlines of his own 
interpretation of Marx’s methodology. In the latter texts, the ideas were 
formulated in a more precise manner. I am referring to the 
methodological structuralism thesis, Marx’s methodological holism 
thesis, and the idea of functional-genetic explanation that he connected 
with Marx’s research method. Generally speaking, he focused on 
working on methodological procedures of research of social 
phenomena, in which a man acts consciously and intentionally, but 
simultaneously his acts are determined by objective conditions. 
 
The thesis of methodological structuralism 
Before Kmita reached for Marx’s works, he had already completed the 
studies on the methodological programme of the representatives of the 
classical German philosophy of the humanities: Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Heinrich Rickert, Eduard Spranger, and Max Weber. If we appeal to Karl 
Popper’s distinction (naturalism-antinaturalism), we can name them 
the studies on anti-naturalist methodology. The result of this research 
was the monograph written together with Leszek Nowak, Studia nad 
teoretycznymi podstawami humanistyki (Poznan , 1968), and a series of 
papers published in philosophical journals. Alongside the anti-
naturalist reflection, we can find here an essay on the concept of 
rational action.  The assumption about the rationality of human actions 
and the conception of the explanation model called a humanistic 
interpretation were elaborated. The interest in rational action and the 
usefulness of this concept in the humanities was a continuation of 
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Ajdukiewicz’s philosophical programme that Kmita supplemented with 
the reflection on the game and decision theory. Analysing Marx’s 
Capital, he paid attention to Marx’s use of the assumption of rationality 
and of his own explanation model of human activities that he called 
humanistic interpretation. In this way Capital confirmed the usage of 
these procedures by Marx. 
The methodological structuralism thesis informs that 
“propositions that characterise the meaningful structure assigned to a 
particular action, which is rational in the light of this assignment,  or to 
the result of such an action, are cognitively prior to propositions that 
characterise the different types of rational action or types of the result 
of the rational action” (Kmita, 1970, p. 73). How did Kmita understand 
the concepts of rational action, meaningful structure and cognitive 
priority? By rational action he understood a conscious and intentional 
activity, i.e. the activity which is subjectively determined by three 
elements: “The rational action is the action Ai that is determined by: 1. 
the knowledge K of the subject of an action Ai that characterises (a) the 
set {A1,…,An} (i = 1,…,n) of possible actions, (b) the effects of an every 
action A1,…An, that I will subsequently call values S1,…,Sm. 2. Norms N of 
the subject of an action Ai that establish the relations of preference R, 
which  gives order to the set of values {S1,…,Sm} and  will be 
subsequently called the order of values. 3. The rationality of the subject 
of an action Ai, i.e., the fact that it always chooses the action that results 
in the value that he prefers the most” (Kmita, 1970, p. 67). This value 
gives a meaning to an action. 
The explanation of the subject taking up rational action is thus 
based on attributing a meaningful structure to the agent of that action. 
The meaningful structure consists of a system of dependencies among 
three elements: the knowledge of an actor, the system of values ordered 
by his preference, and the assumption of rationality which states that 
the subject chooses an action leading to his preferred value. The most 
preferred value gives an action its meaning. Kmita calls this type of 
explanation of  rational action a humanistic interpretation. In the 
century-long philosophical debate on the concept of interpretation in 
which the understanding of human activity was opposed to the 
explanation of this activity, Kmita took the unconventional position 
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preferring the explanation. One can not only understand human actions, 
but primarily explain them along with the fact that Kmita’s model of 
exceptionless explanation (humanistic interpretation) meets the formal 
conditions of the causal explanation. He took a stance which was 
contrary to the position accepted by the followers of hermeneutic 
philosophy, who advocated solely for the understanding of human 
action, rigorously juxtaposing understanding with explanation. 
These premises led Kmita to formulate the methodological 
structuralism thesis, which states that every human activity has its 
meaningful structure and if the subject of a humanist’s inquiry is a 
particular activity, then its analysis must be preceded by the assumption 
of the meaningful structure of this activity. The meaningful structure 
creates a kind of pattern providing a given direction to an inquiry that 
must be observed during the empirical studies of a particular human 
activity. 
 In short, the aim of this research practice is the analysis of a 
particular meaningful structure (the activity of a baker, a painter, a 
politician etc.). All the mentioned kinds of concrete activities follow the 
same pattern: they have a meaningful structure. Kmita gave the 
methodological structuralism directive the status of the researchers-
addressed norm, demanding “their research practice to be conducted in 
a manner defined by the thesis of methodological structuralism” (Kmita, 
1970, p. 64), which means that the humanities, in their effort to know 
human activities, should explain them by attributing the proper, 
empirically-verified meaningful structure to them. 
The most controversial part was the assumption of rationality 
(for conditions of certainty): “the statement that a rational action Ri has 
just been taken up follows logically from the conjunction of the 
following statements: 1. from the statement that the subject of an action 
Ai had knowledge on the basis of  which he can take up one of the 
actions A1,…,An leading respectively to values S1,…,Sm; 2. from the 
statement that the norms of the subject of an action Ai define the 
hierarchy of values according to which the value of the action Ai is 
maximally preferred; 3. from the assumption of rationality” (Kmita, 
1970, p. 67). 
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He added that the assumption of rationality can be understood 
objectively or metalinguistically (we can speak of an action or of the 
sentences describing it). Most controversial was the assumed 
characteristic of rationality (of decision making), which was a far cry 
from the everyday understanding of rationality and rational action. In 
many debates, critics demanded a definition of „the essence” of the 
rational conduct, and the formulation of criteria for distinguishing the 
rational action from irrational or non-rational. According to Kmita’s 
intention, a researcher who appeals to the assumption of rationality 
should simultaneously abstract from the assessment of the evaluative 
choices made by an acting subject, and from the true/false 
qualifications of knowledge selected by an actor as a means of action. 
According to this assumption, someone acts rationally even if he or she 
chooses values that are not accepted in a given culture (considered as 
irrational, non-rational, or incomprehensible), and has erroneous 
knowledge about the path of their realization. If one thinks about 
Marxism as an ideology that is expressed in a specific axiology and the 
manner of arriving at it, then the assumption of rationality formulated 
by Kmita is disappointing, and it is not surprising that its content was 
often misunderstood. What became unintelligible in this interpretation 
of Marx’s work was abstracting values and the means of their 
realisation recommended by Marx from positive evaluation. Nobody 
noticed or considered the fact that the assumption of rationality does 
not collide with advocating the selection of a certain set of substantially 
specific values, including Marxist axiology. Both Marxists or non-
Marxists, the followers of various ideologies or research programmes, 
act rationally (their adherents follow the goals and choose means to 
realise them), or we must assume that they are rational for the 
explanation of these actions to be possible. Failing to accept this 
assumption undercuts the effort to make the humanities an intellectual 
activity that will meet the requirements of scientific knowledge in a 
manner defined by the standards of the natural sciences. The 
humanities would not have tools to explain human behaviour in a 
justifiable way, and to give meanings to the results of action. The 
assumption of rationality in the dominant ideological approach to 
Marxism in Poland had turned out to be worthless. The argument that 
this assumption is the basic element of the explanation of the 
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humanistic interpretation (causal explanation of action-taking), and 
that its removal makes the procedure of the explanation of the human 
activity impossible were incomprehensible and thus misguided. 
Besides, the scientific ideal of the humanities was no alien to Marx who 
believed in the naturalistic paradigm of practising science. 
There is also the second circumstance which reveals the 
importance of the assumption of the rationality of decision making in 
the context of the object of interest of the social sciences. It is a relation 
between the subject’s world of thought and the action taken by him. 
After all, there is no necessity by means of which having a particular 
motivation must result in acting upon it. Philosophers notice this 
problem. They invoke the concept of the will (to act), and trying to 
analyse it they mobilise metaphysics. Giving up the metaphysical 
reflections on the will, one can refer to the assumption of rationality 
stating that a man is consistent, that he acts in accordance with his 
thoughts. Thus, a certain obstacle is being removed, one concerning the 
shift from the world of thoughts and imagination of a man to the sphere 
of the actions undertaken. On the one hand, with the elimination of the 
assumption of rationality, the social inquiries would lose the possibility 
of formulating the credible descriptions of human actions, on the other 
hand, they would lose even the intermediate access to the human 
mental world. After all it is from the results of the actions, all the 
artefacts amongst them, we learn about the world view of the subject 
and we authenticate the vision that is attributed to the subject by 
looking for the confirmation in the results that he left (the results are 
included in the empirical base). 
Now, Kmita attributed to Marx the knowledge and the usage of 
the methodological structuralism thesis from Capital. The activities of a 
capitalist, a worker, and of any participant in the market economy were, 
to Marx, the rational actions in the above sense. Kmita illustrates this 
thesis with examples taken from Marx’s works, especially the analyses 
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Marx’s thesis of methodological holism 
Marx’s methodological holism thesis assumes the cognitive priority of 
the objective structure over the meaningful structure. Inasmuch as the 
respect for  methodological structuralism is read by Kmita into Marx’s 
line of thought, and into statements he formulated, Marx’s 
methodological holism thesis is classified by him as Marx's original 
achievement. Kmita gave methodological dimension to this assumption, 
one of Marx’s basic theoretical ideas. According to this thesis, the 
identification and the attribution of the specified meaningful structure 
to human actions requires knowledge about the socio-economic system 
that this activity happens in. 
The definition of the meaningful structure had already been 
described in the previous paragraph. To give a sense of Marx’s 
methodological holism, the remark on the pair of the concepts - 
objective-subjective and the definition of cognitive priority are needed. 
In the subject literature, two interpretational tendencies of these 
definitions were dominant: the anthropological and the one that 
emphasized the materialistic ontological monism of Marxism. According 
to the anthropological version, a man’s vision of the world forms the 
only one, subjective reality that is the object of cognition, and according 
to which the subject functions in the world. This vision is of a subjective 
nature, and what is delineated in this vision as objective is also 
subjective; it is connected with idealistic philosophy. The ontological 
materialistic monism in turn accepts the existence of the only objective 
reality, and subjectivity is the special case of what the objective is. Both 
interpretations were inadequate to Kmita in the context of Marx’s 
statements.  He came to a conclusion that the interpretation that will be 
suitable for Marx must fulfil two assumptions: (1) the assumption of the 
subjective character of the process of the cognition of objective reality  
and (2) the assumption of an active role of the subject. The first 
assumption is obvious, it is us, humans, who know the world by means 
of  conceptual tools. The active role of the subject is evident in the belief 
that a human is at the same time an author and an actor of the history 
or  social reality (men create the institutions, and the institutions create 
men). The activity of a man is based on his images of the world, which 
change the world in the actions. The actions of man, the human practice 
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is the place of constitution for the social structures that are recognized 
as  objectively existent, but also as the place of confrontation for the 
visions created,  and for the conceptions with produced reality. These 
interpretations, the anthropological and the monistic, cannot 
simultaneously contain both of these assumptions. The anthropological 
emphasizes human activism in the sphere of cognition and action, the 
monistic and ontologising however, is simultaneously deterministic in 
regard to human activity, being reduced here to objective conditions. 
Kmita suggested the following interpretation of Marx’s 
understanding of a pair of the concepts objective-subjective, in which 
“(…) the subjective is expressed as the subjective and the subjective is 
expressed as the objective, has its own representation in the form of, let 
us say, the meaningful structures (subjective and subjectifying 
representation of given objectivity) or contrarily, in the form of given 
functional assumptions that correspond to so-called the quantitative 
laws” (Kmita, 1970, p. 79). In Kmita’s interpretation, Marx was a realist. 
He assumed the existence of an objective reality, but at the same time he 
claimed that human actions are subjectively determined (the 
methodological structuralism thesis) by the knowledge and the values 
of the acting subject. What we call objective reality can be only 
represented subjectively, or represented in a subjective-objective way. 
The subjective representation pertains to the beliefs of the acting 
subjects, and thus to the state of the recognition of their own activity. 
The subjectively objectifying representation is cognitive knowledge 
(fulfilling the scientific criteria and thus intersubjective) about the 
human actions that are formulated in the studies, the scientific ones for 
instance. 
According to Marx’s thesis of methodological holism, the 
propositions about the objective whole (in the above sense of the word 
‘objectivity’), i.e. the propositions about the socio-economic system, 
have cognitive primacy over the propositions describing types of 
rational actions or their products. In other words, the mentioned 
cognitive primacy is noticeable in the following directive: to explain 
human behaviour, aside from indicating the motives of the actors, one 
must refer to the propositions that characterise the socio-economic 
system in which the action takes place. Obviously not every action can 
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be explained by the propositions describing the socio-economic system. 
I will return to this later. 
Kmita’s analysis of the category of labour in Capital was 
inspirational in the context of devising the new meanings of Marx’s 
concepts: subjective and objective. Marx characterised labour as, on the 
one hand,  the rational activity understood as the meaningful structure 
(here Marx was realising the methodological structuralism directive), 
and on the other hand, he perceived labour as located in the socio-
economic system, which gave it an altogether different meaning. The 
relativisation of labour to the capitalist socio-economic structure 
reveals a new dimension of human activity. This is a type of labour 
characteristic Marx considers to be objective and conditioning for 
intentional human activity. The objective characteristic is made within 
the scientific theory about the socio-economic system, thus what the 
scientific theory states is for Marx the representation of objective reality 
(subjectifying objectivity). Thus, when one speaks about the objectivity, 
what one can mean is only the objectivity that is recognised by the 
consciousness formed independently from the beliefs of the subjects 
engaged in the capitalist process of production. Marx’s method of 
inquiry, according to Kmita, is the realisation of Marx’s methodological 
holism thesis. 
Labour as the process of production of use-value gives human 
effort a given meaningful structure, sets goals, and recognises the 
nature of the means of production used. Realising a given goal, labour is 
a meaningful action. The rational action, i.e., labour producing a given 
use-value, Marx also considers in a different manner: as the process of 
production of values with a certain objective effect assigned; whereby 
the value exists only in the use-value, in the commodity. Thus, 
considering labour in light of production of values simultaneously 
assumes the understanding of labour as rational activity producing use-
value. Use labour needs to exist for labour creating values to come into 
existence. The production of values by labour is referred to by Marx as 
the socio-economic system, because the value is determined by the time 
of the social labour that is necessary for its creation. Value is 
quantifiable, and there is a standard of its measurement. 
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“As far as the subject of labour understood as the rational action which uses the means 
of production in a way set by his own knowledge and the goal of labour, labour 
understood as the production of values flows (leads to given results) in a way set by 
the socio-economic system no matter if the person entangled in the process treats the 
result of this process as his own or not” (Kmita, 1970, p. 92). 
Concrete labour is regarded subjectively (conscious and 
intentional activity), and objectively–when it is considered as the value 
producing (the objective effect of the action realizing the intended goal), 
then: “It is now no longer the labourer that employs the means of 
production, but the means of production that employ the labourer” 
(Marx, Capital, ch. 8). 
The dual characteristics of the category of labour in Capital, 
Kmita considered the characteristic feature of Marx’s method of 
research into social phenomena. The point of view on human labour 
understood concretely was connected with the one understood 
abstractly. This connection is very original. The acting subjects’ (a 
capitalist and a worker) knowledge of a goal, and a means of action (the 
meaningful structure of an action) differs, it does not correspond with 
the knowledge of the same action, which is defined as the element of the 
capitalist socio-economic system. They are not reducible to one another. 
The theory of capitalism, according to Marx, includes the knowledge of 
the socio-economic system. 
Functional-genetic explanation 
Now, let me go back to the previous issue of Kmita’s interpretation 
regarding the connection between the meaningful structure, and the 
whole of the socio-economic system. This problem can be formulated as 
the following question: does every action taken by a subject (the 
meaningful structure) need to be explained based on the knowledge of the 
socio-economic whole? The followers of the ontological monist 
interpretation of Marxism answered in the affirmative. However, the 
admirers of the anthropological interpretation either agreed on the 
autonomy of both accounts of the concept of labour (subjective and 
objective), or they suggested redundancy of the subjective account in 
spite of the fact that for other (non-economic) humanistic disciplines 
they suggested the humanistic interpretation. I will explain in advance 
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that in Kmita’s interpretation not every action is determined by the 
socio-economic system, and therefore not every action can be, or needs 
to be, explained in terms of knowledge of the socio-economic structure. 
“Now it is doubtless that the whole class of human activities need not be explained, 
according to Marx – in any way taking into account the actual socio-economic system. 
These are activities that are non-rational, natural, i.e., the ones that cannot be 
interpreted humanistically by attributing to their subjects the given knowledge and 
goals. (…) According to Karl Marx, only some individual rational actions should be 
explained exclusively in terms of the socio-economic system” (Kmita, 1970, p. 107-
108). 
Kmita also argued that the belief postulating the existence of 
rational action which could be explained exclusively in terms of the 
actual socio-economic system would be inadequate to Marx’s theory. 
Then which rational actions, or types of rational actions, should be 
explained by the propositions about socio-economic structure? 
“The explanation in terms of the actual socio-economic system can be applied to: (1) 
non-dissemination of particular forms of consciousness, (2) their dissemination, (3) 
their persistence, (4) their fading” (Kmita, 1970, p. 112). 
Not only can these types of rational actions be explained in terms 
of the knowledge about the socio-economic system, but also the 
products of the actions that can disseminate and fade in a society.  In 
other words the originality of the method of Capital is that it can be 
applied to the explanation of an origin of social beliefs, and their fading 
in a given society. This explanation is not about claiming that a certain 
type of action could not disseminate because it was retrograde towards 
a given social structure, or it was too modern for a given age. Rather, it is 
about whether or not the system “granted” the possibility to realise the 
meaning of rational action, or if it made this realisation impossible. This 
consent takes place when the meaning of the action is consistent with 
the objective result of this action in the context of the socio-economic 
system. If, for instance, the goal of a capitalist is to multiply profit (the 
meaning of a capitalist’s activity), and if the characteristics of the 
economic process indicate that the objective result of this process is the 
multiplication of profit, then we have the sought-after consistency 
between the goal and the result of the objective process. Then, the 
actions taken by the capitalist have the opportunity to disseminate. For 
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the capitalist, the increase of profit is a value, and simultaneously, the 
profit is an objective result of the capitalist economic process. If there is 
a difference between the above explained goal and a description of the 
results of the economic process indicated by the theory, then the actions 
of a capitalist in the previous manner cannot disseminate and can even 
fade. A type of explanation for human actions and their products, or the 
system of beliefs that embraces the dissemination or fading of the above 
mentioned categories in a given socio-economic structure, Kmita 
termed the functional-genetic explanation and declared as Marx’s 
methodological directive in Capital. 
Developing a model of functional-genetic explanation, Kmita 
took up the issues that had not been adequately recognised. Those were 
(1) reflections on the kind of determination that takes place between a 
meaningful structure and the socio-economic whole in which this action 
occurs, and (2) the methodological account of the socio-economic 
system that constitutes the autonomous whole. 
According to Kmita’s interpretation of Marx, the characteristics 
of action in terms of socio-economic system, or the objective conditions 
of action, should include the meaningful structure of an action. The 
characteristics of an action as rational, of its subjective context (a value 
and knowledge of the acting subject) is thus necessary. If we were to 
understand the basic thesis of historical materialism as do the majority 
of Marxists, that the objective socio-economic conditions causally 
determine the subjective context of an action, then Marx’s reflections 
on, let us say, concrete labour would be redundant and 
incomprehensible. The concept of abstract labour would be sufficient. 
In the characteristics of abstract labour, the concept of concrete labour 
would be implicite included (the concept of concrete labour would be 
reduced to the concept of abstract labour). However, Marx emphasised 
the duality of the concept of human labour, arguing that the value of 
abstract labour does not exists without the use-value produced in the 
process of concrete labour. Karl Marx’s deliberations directed Kmita’s 
attention to search for a model of the determination connected with  
historical materialism which would be more adequate than the causal 
model. The goal was to give an account of the determinacy relations of 
the subjective context of determination by an objective one, which 
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would avoid a reduction of the subjective context to the objective one. 
After the critical analysis of the belief in which  historical materialism is 
seen as relying on the model of causal determination, he came to a 
conclusion that  functional determination would be more adequate to 
Marx’s intentions. He replaced causal determination with his own 
model of functional determination, arguing that it better corresponds 
with Marx’s beliefs than the dogmatic account of the causal 
determination model. The source of Kmita’s inspiration in developing 
the concept of functional relations, and the concept of functional 
explanation and functional structure, were the works of, on the one 
hand, the French Marxists Louis Althusser and E tienne Balibar and the 
Polish economist Oskar Lange and, on the other hand, the French 
psychologist Jean Piaget, the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss and 
the contemporary research on Darwinian evolution (Kmita, 1973, p. 
237-254). 
A little bit earlier, in the mid 1960’s, the French Marxists had 
been the first to start research the model of determination assumed by 
Marx in Capital, seriously questioning the universal attribution of the 
causal determination model to Marx. They applied a similar approach to 
the concept of socio-economic system, making use of the structuralist 
thesis in defining the concept of the socio-economic whole. In 
discussion with the above mentioned thinkers, Kmita developed the 
concept of the functional structure. According to Kmita, the socio-
economic structure is adequately represented by the functional 
structure, which he understood in biological terms: 
“By the functional structure I understand every single organism, often the organism 
with its immediate surroundings. The functional structure can be roughly 
characterised in the following way: (1) it divides into a series of elements whereby for 
every single element there is a certain repertoire of its possible states; (2) in the set of 
every possible sequence of elemental states, which I will call the global states, there is 
a distinguished proper subset of it, so that a given structure has a determined 
property P, known usually as the state of equilibrium if and only if it is characterised 
by the global state which is a member of this subset; (3) for every subsequence of the 
elements there are subsequences of the elemental state so that with any given state of 
other elements the structure would not have the property P–this type of subsequence 
of the elemental states we will call the anti-functional series of the elemental states; 
(4) the functional structure always has the respective value” (Kmita, 1973, p. 213-
214). 
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The premises of the functional explanation making up its 
explanans he called the functional reason. 
The functional reason of the answer to the question “(…) why is 
there  chlorophyll in the leafage? Can be put in the following way: 
(1) This organism is an embryophyte. 
(2) Every embryophyte is capable of photosynthesis. 
(3) Lack of chlorophyll in the leafage of an embryophyte 
would cause its loss of the capability of photosynthesis (it is anti-
functional on account of the capability of photosynthesis) 
There is a chlorophyll in the leafage of this plant”. 
The premise (3) of the functional reason is the functional law, 
while the premise (2) formulates the law of maintaining equilibrium. 
From this moment up to the time of development of the model of the 
functional explanation, of the functional dependence etc., the 
fundamental epistemological issue taken up by Kmita which pertained 
to Marx was expressed in the question about the relations between the 
meaning and the functional reason. 
While identifying the socio-economic whole with the functional 
structure on account of a given property P, he replaced the causal 
determination commonly attributed to Marx with the functional 
determination. The functional explanation embraced the valid 
explanation of the features of particular elemental states of this 
structure, and particular subsequences of its elements. 
The socio-economic structure functionally determines its 
elemental states while human consciousness is one of the possible 
elemental states of this whole. The functional law takes the form of a 
statement that it will be impossible to maintain a state of equilibrium of 
a given socio-economic structure, if the appropriate type of beliefs 
(meaningful structures) does not appear in this structure. To the 
functional structure in form of the socio-economic whole, the law of 
maintaining the state of equilibrium is the thesis of reproduction. The 
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socio-economic whole is in a state of equilibrium if there is 
reproduction i.e., all of the social relations are reproduced. The simple 
reproduction takes place when every relation is reproduced in the same 
form. There can also be an extended reproduction that increases in a 
reproductive cycle, and an atrophic reproduction that diminishes the 
extent of the social relations in a reproductive cycle. 
From the characteristics of the functional mechanism follows 
that the content of the beliefs “serving” the functional structure cannot 
be derived from it. In other words this structure does not determine the 
content of beliefs. Let me remind that through functional explanation, 
one can explain only their dissemination, fading, and persistence. How 
do the meaningful structures that turned out to be functional originate? 
Firstly, let us note that reflection on consciousness and the ways of its 
dissemination goes beyond the scope of considerations pertaining to 
functional mechanisms, examples of which are brought by biology. 
When we enter the territory of the humanities the objective biological 
analogies are useless. However, it does not mean that the theory of 
evolution stops being the inspiration for the social sciences. The formal 
analogies between the theory of development of the natural world, and 
the description of the progress of the human world, including the 
sphere of subjectivity, are still being exploited. Social theories of 
development take into account the relations between the subjective and 
objective context of action. 
In Kmita’s conceptual apparatus the relations are identified as 
those occurring between causal determination (subjective context of 
action) and  functional determination (the objective context of action); 
also between the motives of a human action and the socio-economic 
structure. Kmita was not completely satisfied with the answer given by 
Althusser who admittedly also equated the socio-economic structure 
with the functional structure, but he characterised the human actions 
only within an objective context. However, Lange, whose proposition 
Kmita considered to be an example of a diachronic-functional structure, 
reckoned that human actions are functional in regard to the directional 
development of this structure. Both answers were considered by Kmita 
as one-sided, they were insufficiently taking into account, or completely 
ignoring, the subjective contexts of human actions. 
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While analysing K. Marx’s propositions about a dissemination of 
the transformation of natural rent into rent land, the creation of 
manufactures, and the process of exchange, Kmita reached the 
conclusion that Marx used the model of functional-genetic explanation. 
As I already mentioned, while discussing the scope of problems falling 
within the model of the functional-genetic explanation, a chance for 
dissemination exists for these kind of actions and products, or more 
precisely their subjective contexts, in which the meaning of an action 
(also the meaning of the products) is in accordance with the objective 
result (the function of action) of action in the socio-economic structure. 
Moreover, the functional-genetic model explains the upholding and 
fading of beliefs. 
“This is an outline of Marx’s scheme of a functional-genetic explanation of a 
dissemination of the subjective context of a given rational action (…) 
(1) A certain type A action, having a meaning M appears in the 
context of a socio-economic structure E having a property P. 
(2) Every type A action and every M meaning leads to a type R 
result  in the context of any socio-economic structure with a property P. 
(3) S≈R (a result R corresponds approximately  to a subjective goal S). 
(4) If any A type action and meaning M appears in the context of any 
socio-economic structure having a property P, in which  the result of A is R and R≈S, 
then A disseminates in the context of this structure. 
A type A activity and meaning M disseminates in the context of a structure E” 
(Kmita, 1973, p. 253). 
The presented model of the functional-genetic explanation, as it 
can be seen, does not reduce consciousness to the objective context, nor 
does the socio-economic structure determine causally the content of 
beliefs that contribute to the meaningful structures. Kmita 
acknowledged the above reconstructed mechanism, one which hides 
behind the model of the dissemination of the subjective context 
explanation, to be the fundamental in Marx’s thinking. The developed 
model of the functional-genetic explanation which argues for the 
acceptance of characterising human activity in terms of decision 
rationality is necessary not only in the process of explaining individual 
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activities which are devoid of a greater historical meaning, but it is also 
necessary in the process of explaining historically important decisions 
made in the name of community and the phenomena concerning mass 
activity. 
Explaining historical phenomena of development 
Kmita regarded the explanation of historical development phenomena 
as a foreground task for Marx’s theory of scientific knowledge. In the 
Introduction to Założenia teoretyczne badań nad rozwojem historycznym 
(1970) he mentioned some reasons in favour of this approach. As part 
of this task, he worked on the meaning of the fundamental theses of  
materialistic holism, and he inferred from them the consequences 
pertaining to the development of the social sphere of the scientific 
practice. In the mentioned text, he uses the phrase Marx’s theory of 
scientific knowledge. The leader of The Poznan Methodological School 
was encouraged to use this concept perhaps by the results of the 
analyses of Marx’s research method that had been conducted by the 
School so far. Marx’s research method was elevated to the level of an 
epistemological theory which, as a coherent and organised set of the 
methodological propositions, should have a proper legitimisation 
(philosophical justification) to avoid typical objections raised against 
rival epistemologies (for instance Neopositivist or Popperian). The 
important postulate addressed to any philosophical conception is also 
the demand of self-referential application of its own statements to itself. 
Therefore Marxist epistemology cannot precede science, “be a science 
before science” (to use Marx’s phrase); it is preceded by historical 
materialism. Historical materialism itself is historical, so is the Marxist 
theory of scientific knowledge. The reflection on the status of historical 
materialism and the general theory of social development included in it 
provides, in Kmita’s interpretation, the premises for explaining the 
development of the scientific practice, its subjective context composed 
of methodological norms and directives. The binding norms and 
directives of a given discipline or group of disciplines were constituted 
and universalised as the response to the expectations towards science 
through the demands of   social development of the socio-economic 
structure in which the science functions. 
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Kmita began his reflection on Marx’s conception of social 
progress with the analysis of the Darwinian theory of the evolution of 
species, in an effort to reconstruct this type of explanation in the 
categories of philosophy of science. He concluded that if the theory of 
evolution explains the development of species, then the pattern of this 
explanation is in any way different form the explanation pattern of 
physics. The fundamental difference lies in the selection of general 
propositions, i.e. scientific laws that are the necessary element of every 
model of explanation. Comparing the law of physics with the 
fundamental law of theory of evolution (the principle of natural 
selection) he distinguished two kinds of laws: "(...) (1) laws in the 
narrow sense – describing specific regularities; (2) nomological 
formulas describing contour regularities” (Kmita, 1976, p. 55). The 
distinction between the types of laws turned to be the basis of the two 
kinds of explanation: the exceptionless explanation, the explanans of 
which would include scientific law in the narrow sense, and the 
historical explanation, the explanans of which includes the nomological 
formula. 
The position that the application of the exceptionless 
explanation model has a limited range in the humanities, because of the 
difficulties with  formulating scientific laws in the narrow sense is 
commonly accepted, and the view that this group of disciplines is of an 
idiographic nature becomes more and more popular. Kmita’s historical 
explanation gives a solution to the outlined dilemma. It connects the 
two opposite positions, helping to hold the view that social knowledge 
is nomological, while simultaneously being idiographic. The specific 
character of nomological formulas and corresponding overall 
regularities lies in the fact that laws as nomological formulas indicate 
only the main functional dependence (the natural selection and the 
function of mutations). Referring to the law of natural selection is in no 
way a final form of explanation. The actual empirical studies are 
necessary to conform the nomological formula to empirical data. It is 
necessary to equip the formula with empirical content accommodating 
the spatiotemporal parameters of the phenomena being explained. It is 
about recognising particular mutations that are predicted in the 
evolutionary principle of natural selection. 
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By the analogy with the status of the laws of biological evolution, 
Kmita attributed the status of nomological formulas to the laws of 
historical materialism. 
“The fact that the concrete historical explanation referring to Marxist theory of social 
development uses the explanans in which a unique combination of historical events 
appears, does not exclude the law in the form of a proper nomological formula under 
which this combination falls. In my opinion, the laws of historical materialism are, 
similarly as for instance the principle N of natural selection for the biological theory of 
evolution, the nomological formulas” (Kmita, 1976, p. 62). 
In the discussed interpretation, Marx’s laws of historical 
materialism direct and sensitize the researcher to the problems and 
connections that should be taken into account, but in no way does 
historical materialism replace the honest empirical studies. The laws of 
historical materialism serve the same function as the principles of 
structuralism for the struturalist studies. Additionally, if we assume the 
distinction between the social and individual consciousness, as Kmita 
did, then it follows that the social practice functionally determines the 
social, but not the individual, consciousness, i.e. the commonly accepted 
belief that actually lingers in a given state of the socio-economic 
structure.   
 
Marxist theory of scientific knowledge 
To the area of Marxist epistemology recreated by Kmita, apart from 
historical explanation and characteristics of the status of historical 
materialism, we should add the speculations concerning the social 
practice and historical possibility and necessity. These speculations 
were carried out in a methodological spirit, and their intention was to 
create proper methodological tools, on the one hand enabling the 
possibility of knowledge of social phenomena, and on the other, building 
the understanding of Marx’s perspective of inquiry. 
The social practice, taken from the view of epistemology 
attributed by Kmita to Marx, was characterised as “(…) a special case of 
the diachronic, hierarchical functional structure–on account of the 
(developmental) global quality consisting of the reproduction of the 
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existing objective conditions connected with the production of the new 
conditions of this sort” (Kmita, 1976, p. 21). 
As one can see, the above understanding of practice is consistent 
with the previous findings made within the framework of this 
interpretation, but let us notice that they are distant from the common 
sense meaning of the term “practice”. 
The reflections on the concepts of historical possibility and 
necessity in turn complete the methodological model of historical 
explanation. The goal was to better define the historical process 
through pointing at the historical necessity that determines the social 
practice. A thing that is initially only possible becomes a necessary fact, 
becomes real in the process of actualization of this possibility in the 
social practice. In other words, this happens when one of the possible 
projects achieves, through the practice, the form that is independent 
from the project. Referring to the findings of William Dray, who 
distinguished two independent procedures in historical studies 
(answering two questions: Why did the given situation happen? and How 
did it happen?), Kmita took these two procedures to be connected by the 
concepts of historical necessity and possibility (Kmita, 1976, p. 69n.). 
In the subsequent chapters of Szkice z teorii poznania naukowego 
Kmita was concerned with the scientific practice which he defined as 
the substructure of the dynamic and hierarchical functional structure 
that he identified with the whole socio-economic system. His thought 
slowly evolved towards the shifting from “(…) the problems of the 
theory of historical knowledge to the problems of the historical theory 
of knowledge” (Kmita, 1976, p. 29). Then he took up the task of 
developing an epistemological theory which he named historical 
epistemology. Kmita always thought that “(…) among the ideas making 
up the Marxist account of the social world and the ways of knowing one 
can extract a number of thoughts that constitute not only a certain 
conception of science but also the conception that is able to face the 
difficulties that the contemporary philosophy of science is struggling 
with” (Kmita, 1983, p. 45). 
Kmita tried to show the validity of inspirations drawn from Marx 
in the process of solving the problems of philosophy of science that in 
the second half of the 20th century was going through a crisis. The crisis 
was connected with two groups of issues: the status of methodological 
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norms and directives of practicing science (between relativism and 
universalism), and the rules of scientific progress (between 
epistemology and sociology of knowledge). 
 
●●● 
Kmita’s interpretation of Marxism discussed above is very specific, 
because it was developed from the perspective of philosophy of science 
and its state at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, i.e. 
one hundred years after Marx’s Capital had been published (1867). Karl 
Marx was not a methodologist nor a theoretician of science; he was a 
philosopher and social scientist who developed and applied an original 
method of inquiry. He did not lay out systematically the methodological 
rules of his method. Among his published works, we can find only a few 
casual remarks on the applied method. Those remarks are scattered 
throughout his texts. One can also use, as Kmita did, the analyses of 
social phenomena that Marx carried out according to this method. In 
these circumstances, the effort to make Marx's methodological 
statements consistent was–and still is–a considerable intellectual 
challenge. But the interpretation of Kmita aimed at something more: at 
the restating of Marx’s scientific methods in the categories, concepts 
and problems of philosophy of science as it was in the second half of the 
20th century, and in doing so it endeavoured to achieve three goals. 
First, to demonstrate the competitiveness of Marx’s approach against 
the dominant methodological paradigms at that time, and second, to 
provide the research tools for the contemporary theoretical analyses 
of the social world. Last–and supposedly not least–not to lose this 
“something” characteristic of Marx’s thought. Thus, Kmita’s 
interpretation of Marxism is not restricted to a literal reading of 
Marx’s texts. 
 
translated by Ewa Modrakowska 
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JERZY KMITA’S METHODOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF KARL 
MARX’S PHILOSOPHY. FROM IDEOLOGY TO METHODOLOGICAL 
CONCEPTS 
The article presents J. Kmita’s methodological interpretation of selected 
cognitive methods used by K. Marx. Those methods were (and I believe 
they still are) significant for the social sciences and the humanities, even 
a century after they had been developed. J Kmita’s interpretation 
reveals specificity of epistemic procedures carried out by the author of 
“Capital” and emphasizes contemporary actuality of Marx’s 
epistemological ideas. To achieve that aim, Kmita refers to the concepts 
established in the field of philosophy of science of his time. According to 
J. Kmita, the attractiveness of Marx’s approach lies in the opportunity to 
develop a methodological interpretation of Marx philosophy, which in 
turn enables the formation of a unique theory of science development, 
alternative to those provided by logical positivism, falsificationism, 
neopragmatism or sociology of knowledge. Such theory would combine 
the perspective of sociology of knowledge with an epistemological 
approach to the development of science. 
KEYWORDS: historical explanation, functional explanation, functional-
genetic explanation, humanistic interpretation, methodological 
structuralism, Marxist holism, assumption of rationality 
JERZEGO KMITY INTERPRETACJA METODOLOGICZNA FILOZOFII 
KAROLA MARKSA. OD IDEOLOGII DO POJĘĆ METODOLOGICZNYCH 
W artykule przedstawia się interpretację metodologiczną wybranych 
przez J. Kmitę metod poznawczych stosowanych przez K. Marksa. 
Metody te, były (i mys lę, z e są nadal) doniosłe dla uprawiania nauk 
społecznych i humanistycznych jeszcze po stu latach od ich powstania. 
W przeprowadzonej interpretacji, wydobywa J. Kmita specyfikę 
sposobu postępowania poznawczego two rcy Kapitału oraz ukazuje 
aktualnos c rozwiązan  epistemologicznych Marksa. Wykorzystuje do 
tego celu dorobek wspo łczesnego mu stanu filozofii nauki. Atrakcyjnos c 
Marksa, zdaniem J. Kmity, lez y w moz liwos ci wypracowania w oparciu o 
metodologicznie zinterpretowany dorobek Marksa, nowatorskiej w 
stosunku do logicznego empiryzmu, falsyfikacjonizmu, 
neopragmatyzmu czy socjologii wiedzy, koncepcji rozwoju nauki. 
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Łączyłaby ona perspektywę socjologii wiedzy z podejs ciem 
epistemologicznym w charakteryzowaniu procesu rozwoju nauki. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: wyjas nianie historyczne, wyjas nianie 
funkcjonalne, wyjas nianie funkcjonalno-genetyczne, interpretacja 
humanistyczna, strukturalizm metodologiczny, holizm marksistowski, 
załoz enie o racjonalnos ci 
